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Abstract As a corporate organizational form, real estate investment trusts
(REITs) fall into two competing property management
structures: internally advised and externally advised. This study
tests the hypothesis that, due to their superior ability to resolve
conﬂicts of interests between REIT management and
shareholders, internally-advised REITs will dominate the
externally-advised REITs. We also test the hypothesis that larger
REITs will come to dominate the market and ﬁnd support for
this hypothesis. The results conﬁrm that externally-advised
REITs are responding to market pressure to conform to the
performance standards set by newer, internally-advised REITs.
Two competing organizational structures exist for REITs: internally advised and
externally advised. As originally envisioned, REITs were to be passive investment
vehicles much like mutual funds, except with trading restrictions. As a result,
REITs had to retain ‘advisors’ who carried out functions similar to mutual fund
portfolio managers. These advisors selected properties and executed investment
strategies for the REIT. However, unlike stock or bond portfolios, real estate assets
require active management to lease, operate and ﬁnance the properties. Thus,
REITs also engaged ‘property managers’ who were responsible for the operation
of the property. In the late 1980s, several REITs recognized the inefﬁciencies and
inherent conﬂicts of interest between these advisors/managers and the REIT
shareholders resulting from fee structures that were not tied to REIT performance.1
This conﬂict between advisor/managers and REIT shareholders was a detriment
to growth in the property sector. Without the ability to actively manage assets,
traditional developers/operators risked losing control of their properties upon
conversion to REIT status. In 1986, private letter rulings from the Internal Revenue
Service allowed REITs to assume responsibility for selecting investment properties
and managing assets, allowing them to obtain ‘self-advised’ and ‘self-managed’
status.2 The importance of eliminating these conﬂicts was not widely recognized
until after the Kimco REIT Initial Public Offering (IPO) in 1991. Thus, REITs
present an interesting case where two competing organizational structures existed
during a period of rapid growth.
The remarkable growth of REITs during the 1990s coincided with the creation of
the internally-advised structure has caused some to hypothesize that the self-142  Ambrose and Linneman
advised/self-managed REIT will dominate the real estate property sector.3 As an
initial test of this hypothesis, we examine the ﬁnancial and accounting differences
between older, externally-advised REITs and the internally-advised REITs
prevalent in the 1990s. We systematically examine the impact of differences in
organization structure using standard accounting and ﬁnancial measures of REIT
growth prospects, revenue and expense ratios, proﬁtability ratios and capital cost
estimates.
A second related hypothesis proposed by Linneman (1997), which has received
considerable attention in both the popular press and the scholarly literature, is that
larger REITs enjoy signiﬁcant advantages over smaller REITs with respect to
economies of scale in revenues, expenses and capital. Thus, we also examine the
impact of ﬁrm size on these ﬁnancial and accounting performance measures to
test for the presence of scale economies. Our results are consistent with Capozza
and Seguin (2000) who ﬁnd that, between 1985 and 1992, externally-advised
REITs consistently under-perform internally-advised REITs due to higher
ﬁnancing expenses. By extending the analysis to REITs from 1990 to 1996, our
analysis indicates that externally-advised REITs are responding to market
pressures becoming more like the newer, internally-advised REITs.
 Data
The data consists of 139 equity REITs trading on either the New York or American
Stock Exchange between 1990 and 1996, with monthly returns available on the
CRSP tapes and ﬁnancial data available from SNL REIT Datasource. The
Appendix provides greater detail on the sample construction. The sample is
divided into two portfolios. The ﬁrst portfolio consists of equity REITs that retain
an outside advisor or property manager. This portfolio primarily represents old-
style, externally-advised REITs operating as passive real estate investment
vehicles. The second portfolio consists of all REITs that are self-advised and self-
managed—the so-called new, internally-advised REITs. These new-style REITs
are organized as fully integrated operating companies that actively manage their
assets. It is important to note that REITs are an organizational/corporate structure
and not an industry segment, as REITs are in many property sectors based on
different market segments (i.e., residential, retail, ofﬁce, hotel, etc.). Because
property sector composition can distort the analysis of REITs, we analyze
internally- and externally-advised REITs controlling for property sector effects
(residential, retail, hotel, ofﬁce/industrial, self-storage and healthcare).
 REIT Corporate Structure
Exhibit 1 breaks down the subsamples by REIT structure and organizational form.
By the end of 1997, 64% of the internally-advised REITs were organized as
umbrella partnership REITs (UPREITs) versus only 31% of externally-advisedREIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  143
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Exhibit 1  REIT Operating Structure
Structure Life
Market Segment UPREIT Trad. Perpetual Finite Life Overall Total
Panel A: Externally-advised REITs
Diversiﬁed 0 7 7 0 7
Healthcare 0 3 3 0 3
Industrial/Ofﬁce 2 2 2 2 4
Residential 1 0 1 0 1
Retail 0 4 3 1 4
Self Storage 0 2 0 2 2
Specialty/Hotel 6 2 8 0 8
Total 9 20 24 5 29
Panel B: Internally-advised REITs
Diversiﬁed 4 2 6 0 6
Healthcare 0 4 4 0 4
Industrial/Ofﬁce 13 5 18 0 18
Residential 23 8 31 0 31
Retail 23 18 41 0 41
Self Storage 3 2 5 0 5
Specialty/Hotel 4 1 5 0 5
Total 70 40 110 0 110
REITs (all of which were converts). Across property sectors, with the exception
of healthcare, the majority of internally-advised REITs for all property categories
are UPREITs. The preponderance of externally-advised REITs converting to
UPREIT status are in the specialty/hotel property sector. Interestingly, the
UPREIT structure dominates the residential, specialty/hotel and industrial/ofﬁce
property sectors. Not surprisingly, these property sectors are rapidly consolidating
(through mergers and property acquisition), with the UPREITs utilizing their tax
efﬁcient ‘‘currency’’ to purchase assets from private partnerships. The large
number of externally-advised specialty/hotel REITs that converted to UPREIT
status highlights the pressure facing externally-advised REITs to compete with
the internally-advised REITs.
All internally-advised REITs are inﬁnite life REITs, whereas 21% of externally-
advised REITs are ﬁnite life REITs. This underscores the distinction between the144  Ambrose and Linneman
operating company (where equity is inﬁnite lived) and investment manager (‘‘you
can only have my money for so long’’) philosophies of these entities. Interestingly,
externally-advised REITs do not differ greatly from internally-advised REITs in
the degree of property category concentration (Exhibit 2).4 In fact, 72% of
internally-advised REITs and 84% of externally-advised REITs are focused on a
single property type (greater than 75% of assets concentrated in one property
type).5
 REIT Growth Prospects
Between 1991 and 1996, externally-advised REIT total equity market
capitalization increased at a compound annual rate of 21.5% (from $6.1 billion to
$19.5 billion).6 At the same time, 93 internally-advised REITs appeared with total
equity market capitalization increasing at an astonishing annual compound rate of
71% (from 9 REITs with a total equity market capitalization of $4 billion, to 102
REITs with a total equity market capitalization of $102 billion). This dramatic
growth in internally-advised REIT equity market capitalization is a function of
both new REIT IPOs, as well as the conversion of externally-advised REITs. For
example, between 1991 and 1996, Security Capital Paciﬁc Trust’s total equity
capitalization grew at a 54% annual growth rate (from $132 million to $1.7
billion), while Starwood Hotels and Resort’s (formerly Hotel Investors Trust)
equity market capitalization increased at an incredible 155% per year (from $5
million to $1.5 billion) over the same period. However, the dramatic growth in
total REIT equity market capitalization hides the fact that externally-advised
REITs have grown at a faster rate than internally-advised REITs. The average
internally-advised REIT equity market capitalization grew at a 14% annual rate
between 1991 and 1996 (from $447 million to $1 billion) while average equity
market capitalization for externally-advised REITs grew at a 20% annual rate
(from $189 million to $557 million).
The difference in equity market capitalization growth rates does not appear to be
due to greater use of debt ﬁnancing on the part of externally-advised REITs.
Between 1994 and 1996, the average ratio of debt to total market capitalization
remained relatively constant, and equal, for both groups at 35% to 37%. In fact,
the leverage ratio for externally-advised REITs has declined from 49% in 1990
to 34% in 1993 while it remained relatively constant for internally-advised REITs
during the same period.
While the leverage ratios of externally-advised and internally-advised REITs have
converged, externally-advised REITs utilize more short-term debt (as a percentage
of total capitalization) while internally-advised REITs utilize more long-term debt.
Between 1993 and 1996, externally-advised REITs had almost twice the level of
short-term debt (5%–8% for externally-advised REITs versus 2%–3% for
internally-advised REITs). However, following the lead of internally-advised

































































Exhibit 2  Ownership Concentration


















Diversiﬁed 2 3 1 1 2 3 3 1
Healthcare 0 0 2 4 0 0 2 4
Industrial/Ofﬁce 1 8 1 4 0 3 1 8
Residential 0 10 2 17 0 3 2 24
Retail 1 23 1 8 0 14 0 14
Self Storage 1 0 1 4 0 0 2 4
Specialty/Hotel 0 2 1 2 0 1 1 7
Total 5 46 8 40 2 24 11 62
Note: Forty REITs had missing or incomplete property segment concentration information.146  Ambrose and Linneman
consistently declined while the percentage of long-term debt has consistently
increased.
Capozza and Seguin (2000) note that between 1985 and 1992, externally-advised
REITs consistently used more debt relative to internally-advised REITs and that
this debt usage was the driving force behind their underperformance relative to
internally-advised REITs. Thus, the shift in leverage ratios for externally-advised
REITs is consistent with the hypothesis that externally-advised REITs have altered
their operating characteristics to remain competitive with internally-advised
REITs.
Most internally-advised REITs are aggressively pursuing growth strategies via
acquisitions and, more recently, development. One measure of the success of this
strategy is the value of the properties purchased. The implied capitalization rate
(NOI divided by average total equity market value) provides a rough proxy for
the pricing of REIT assets—particularly for hotels and residential properties,
which do not have long-term leases. Exhibit 3 reports the mean implied
capitalization rate by property sector. We expect to ﬁnd lower implied
capitalization rates for the more efﬁcient internally-advised REITs. Regression
analysis (Exhibit 4) conﬁrms that the implied cap rates for internally-advised
REITs were signiﬁcantly lower than externally-advised REITs in 1990 and 1993,
indicating that the market places a premium on the management talent of
internally-advised REITs. Across property segments, self-storage REITs have the
highest implied capitalization rates while diversiﬁed REITs have the lowest
implied cap rates with residential properties having the lowest implied
capitalization rates of actual property types. The signiﬁcant F-Statistic indicates
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the property sector coefﬁcients are equal.
We include the log of the market capitalization as a measure of ﬁrm size to test
the hypothesis that the market values larger REITs because of their growth focus
and greater liquidity. The results show a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient for the
quadratic effect of ﬁrm size indicating a non-linear relationship between the
implied capitalization rate and ﬁrm size (market capitalization). Based on this
regression coefﬁcient, we calculate that the maximum (Y/X  0) implied
capitalization rate of 7.3% occurs for small REITs with market capitalizations of
$13 million. Thus, as argued by Linneman (1997), we ﬁnd that the overall implied
capitalization rate declines by approximately 7 basis points per billion dollar
increase in market capitalization, a strong value generating scale effect.
 REIT Revenue and Expenses
One of the driving forces behind the consolidation in the real estate industry is
the belief that the internally-advised REITs, as operating companies, are able to
improve proﬁt margins by controlling expenses. Linneman (1997) argues that ﬁrms
having even a small cost advantage in a highly competitive, commodity type

































































Exhibit 3  Descriptive Statistics for REIT Growth, Expense and Proﬁtability Measures
REIT Growth Prospects REIT Revenue and Expenses REIT Proﬁtability
Implied Cap Rate NOI/Revenues Rental Rev/Revenues G&A Exp/Revenues ROE Payout Ration
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Diversiﬁed 8.729 50.639 80.703 0.157 2.655 74.318
(2.583) (25.618) (25.904) (0.246) (17.448) (29.372)
Healthcare 9.618 99.944 86.881 0.052 11.375 88.175
(1.907) (0.232) (7.853) (0.023) (4.797) (17.996)
Industrial 8.966 72.951 95.732 0.058 5.156 69.500
(1.401) (11.724) (4.225) (0.029) (5.941) (31.187)
Ofﬁce 10.276 63.171 92.732 0.066 2.789 66.550
(3.401) (6.704) (7.733) (0.068) (10.781) (44.902)
Residential 8.564 61.268 94.417 0.078 9.067 82.974
(1.711) (9.475) (7.294) (0.166) (6.831) (29.755)
Retail 9.382 71.273 87.139 0.073 7.312 83.234
(1.943) (11.636) (21.677) (0.157) (58.703) (37.810)
Self-Storage 11.208 62.233 96.267 0.042 7.880 79.724
(4.403) (6.021) (3.403) (0.018) (2.007) (21.351)
Hotel 9.875 77.889 93.917 0.076 5.750 81.750
(2.213) (28.402) (5.261) (0.842) (28.799) (68.170)






















Exhibit 4  Regression Analysis of the Impact of REIT Size (log of market capitalization, LMKTCAP)
Controlling for Industry, Year and Structure (SASM) Effects
REIT Growth Prospects REIT Expense and Revenue REIT Proﬁtability Measures
Implied Cap Rate Rental Rev/Revenues G&A Exp/Revenues NOI/Revenues ROE Payout Ratio
Variable Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Log(mktcap) 0.77 1.3 11.80*** 3.1 1.8E-2 0.3 13.48*** 3.9 2.32 0.2 10.32 1.1
Log(mktcap)2 0.15*** 2.9 1.09*** 3.0 4.9E-4 0.1 1.19*** 3.7 0.04 0.1 1.21 1.4
Hotel 11.08*** 6.9 60.88*** 5.7 1.2E-3 0.0 39.92*** 4.2 23.01 0.9 104.79*** 4.1
Diversiﬁed 9.00*** 5.9 50.26*** 4.9 1.5E-1 1.1 14.50* 1.6 10.35 0.4 96.10*** 3.8
Healthcare 11.11*** 7.0 54.31*** 5.1 1.4E-1 1.0 62.00*** 6.6 7.68 0.3 112.15*** 4.4
Industrial 10.18*** 6.6 61.99*** 5.9 1.3E-1 0.9 35.07*** 3.8 13.29 0.5 96.66*** 3.8
Ofﬁce 11.13*** 7.2 60.17*** 5.8 1.3E-1 1.0 26.16*** 2.9 15.28 0.6 91.52*** 3.7
Residential 9.96*** 6.5 60.27*** 5.9 1.2E-1 0.9 23.44*** 2.6 11.76 0.5 110.08*** 4.4
Retail 10.45*** 6.8 53.04*** 5.2 1.2E-1 0.9 33.34*** 3.7 12.34 0.5 113.40*** 4.5
Self Storage 11.71*** 7.9 65.01*** 6.4 1.0E-1 0.8 26.72*** 3.0 7.35 0.3 101.27*** 4.2
SASM*D90 1.50** 2.2 1.94 0.3 4.7E-2 0.6 0.49 0.1 5.30 0.4 6.29 0.5
SASM*D91 0.58 0.8 1.51 0.3 4.3E-2 0.6 0.94 0.2 2.84 0.2 3.00 0.2
SASM*D92 0.69 1.1 1.83 0.4 1.0E-2 0.2 1.72 0.4 2.03 0.2 18.76* 1.8
SASM*D93 1.32** 2.4 4.03 1.5 2.3E-2 0.7 0.44 0.2 4.71 0.5 44.32*** 6.9
SASM*D94 0.48 1.4 5.46** 2.4 2.8E-2 0.9 1.36 0.7 17.22*** 2.8 15.18*** 2.9
SASM*D95 0.14 0.5 5.84*** 2.7 3.0E-2 1.0 2.25 1.2 4.31 0.8 5.75 1.2
SASM*D96 0.03 0.1 6.14*** 2.7 3.1E-2 1.0 2.60 1.3 3.64 0.7 13.04*** 2.6
R 2 0.96 0.97 0.08 0.96 0.07 0.85
F-Stat. 592.1*** 1078.6*** 2.84*** 806.5*** 2.11*** 170.5***
Equal Years 2.23** 0.87 0.33 0.44 0.98 6.65***
Equal Ind. 7.07*** 6.15*** 1.95** 43.38*** 0.55 3.13***
Notes:
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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internally-advised REITs have a cost advantage, they will eventually dominate
their respective industry. The ratio of net operating income (NOI) to total rental
revenue (gross income) is a useful proxy for ﬁrm proﬁtability. Consistent with the
large ﬁrm hypothesis, we ﬁnd a statistically positive coefﬁcient on ﬁrm size and
a statistically negative coefﬁcient for the quadratic size effect, indicating that ﬁrm
proﬁtability increases with ﬁrm size but at a decreasing rate (Exhibit 4). Sensitivity
analysis (evaluating the regression equation at the data means) indicates that for
every billion dollar increase in market capitalization, REIT proﬁt margins will
increase by approximately 9%. Sensitivity analysis also shows that REITs with
market capitalizations of $285 million have the highest proﬁt margin of 58.4%.
Counter to the expectations, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between REIT
structure and proﬁt margins. Thus, after controlling for property sector effects and
ﬁrm size, it appears that REITs with internal management do not have an
advantage over external REITs by investing in properties with higher proﬁt
margins.
Not surprisingly, signiﬁcant differences in proﬁt margins exist across property
types. For example, internally-advised diversiﬁed REIT proﬁt margins ranged from
67% to 75% between 1993 and 1996, while externally-advised diversiﬁed REIT
proﬁt margins were below 50%. Exhibit 3 reports that the average over the sample
period was 50%. A similar pattern exists in the industrial and ofﬁce sectors, with
internally-advised REIT proﬁt margins in excess of 75% and 65%, respectively,
while externally-advised REIT proﬁt margins are consistently lower. Again, the
overall average proﬁt margin for the sample was 63% for ofﬁce properties and
73% for industrial properties (Exhibit 3). Interestingly, retail REIT proﬁt margins
are equal with neither corporate sector dominant and an average proﬁt margin of
71%. On average, healthcare and hotel REITs have the highest proﬁt margins,
while diversiﬁed and residential REITs have the lowest proﬁt margins, averaging
50% and 61%, respectively. The F-Statistic for the test of equality across property
types is signiﬁcant at the 1% level conﬁrming our ﬁnding that proﬁt margins do
vary across industry groups.
One of the arguments supporting the advantage of the internally-advised REIT
structure is that internal management will better control administrative expenses.
For example, in 1992, externally-advised REIT General and Administrative
(G&A) expenses as a percentage of total revenue averaged 14.4% while internally-
advised REIT G&A expenses averaged just 4.8% of total revenue. By 1996, this
gap had declined dramatically with externally-advised REIT G&A expenses
averaging 6.1% compared with a 5.3% rate for internally-advised REITs.
However, after controlling for ﬁrm size and property sector, we do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant difference in the expense ratios of internally- and externally-advised
REITs over time (Exhibit 4).
We also test for differences in expense ratios across property sectors. As expected,
the F-Statistic for the hypothesis test of equal coefﬁcients across property sectors
is signiﬁcant. We note that diversiﬁed REITs have the highest average G&A
expense at 16% and self-storage REITs have the lowest at 4% (Exhibit 3).150  Ambrose and Linneman
However, the coefﬁcient for ﬁrm size is not signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding does not
support the theory that larger REITs may be able to increase shareholder value
by lowering expense ratios.
On the revenue side, a similar pattern emerges. Internally-advised REIT rental
revenue (operating revenue) accounted for approximately 93% of total revenues.
In 1993, rental revenue accounted for nearly 87% of externally-advised REIT total
revenue. By 1996, the gap between externally-advised and internally-advised
REITs had disappeared, with rental revenues accounting for approximately 92%
to 93% of total revenue. Consistent with the sample means, between 1993 and
1996, we ﬁnd that internally-advised REITs have a higher proportion of their total
revenue resulting from rental operations.
Looking across property sectors, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference in revenue ratios
(Exhibit 3). The signiﬁcant F-Statistic for equality of coefﬁcients across property
sectors indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that revenue ratios are
equal. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that self-storage REITs have the highest ratio of rental
income to total revenue while, not surprisingly, diversiﬁed REITs have the lowest
ratio. Finally, supporting the ﬁrm size hypothesis, the signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on
ﬁrm size suggest that larger ﬁrms derive more of their total revenue from rental
income than smaller REITs. Sensitivity analysis indicates that every billion dollar
increase in market capitalization implies an 8% increase in total revenue resulting
from rental income and a corresponding 6% decline in revenue due to sales of
assets. Given the non-linear relationship between ﬁrm size and revenues, we
estimate the turning point (maximum) for the revenue ratio occurs when REITs
hit $225 million in market capitalization with revenue ratios of 70.4%.
 REIT Cash Flow and Profitability
Given the lack of difference in revenue and expenses between externally-advised
and internally-advised REITs through 1996, it is not surprising that internally and
externally-advised REITs had similar rates of proﬁtability as measured by return
on book equity (ROE).7 With the exception of 1994, when internally-advised
REITs had signiﬁcantly higher ROE than externally-advised REITs, we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant difference in ROE for the two organizational forms. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in ROE across industry segments.
It is hypothesized that internally-advised REITs are more like industrial operating
companies, and will—within the limits of REIT tax law—desire to retain a greater
proportion of cash available for distribution (CAD) in order to take advantage of
growth opportunities. With the exception of 1990 and 1991, we ﬁnd that
internally-advised REITs had signiﬁcantly lower payout ratios (dividends as a
percent of FFO) than externally-advised REITs. For example, in 1996 the average
payout ratio for externally-advised REITs was 95% whereas internally-advised
REITs had an 80% payout ratio. This supports the contention that internally-
advised REITs are utilizing retained cash ﬂow to support substantial assetREIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  151
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acquisition programs. Looking across property sectors, we also ﬁnd signiﬁcant
differences in payout ratios, with ofﬁce REITs having the lowest payout ratios
while retail property REITs had the highest. The low payout ratios in the ofﬁce
and industrial property sectors are contributing to the consolidation taking place
in these markets, where REITs are utilizing retained earnings to help fund their
acquisition strategies. Interestingly, the coefﬁcient on ﬁrm size is signiﬁcantly
positive indicating that, after controlling for property sector and organization
effects, REIT payout ratios increase as ﬁrm size increases.
 REIT Betas
Beta measures the systematic variation in returns relative to the market. To the
extent that internally-advised REITs are different from externally-advised REITs,
we expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the factors impacting REIT systematic
risk. We test this hypothesis by regressing individual REIT estimated betas on
ﬁrm size and other ﬁnancial factors (payout ratio, debt ratio, asset growth, FFO
growth and implied capitalization rate), controlling for property market segment,
and external/internal-advised REIT status interacted with time dummy variables.
Yearly REIT equity betas are estimated using the CAPM framework by regressing
the previous twenty-four months REIT returns against the market index:
R    R   , (1) i tii m ti t
where Ri,t and Rm,t represent the monthly returns for REIT i and the market
portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate for the twenty-four prior months, i is the
regression intercept, i is the estimated equity beta for REIT i and i,t is the
standard error term. Thus, December 1993 betas are estimated by regressing the
REIT returns less the risk-free rate against the CRSP value-weighted market index
less the risk-free rate for the period from November 1991 to December 1993.8
We ﬁnd that internally-advised REITs have signiﬁcantly higher betas than
externally-advised REITs (Exhibit 5) in 1995 and 1996. The positive coefﬁcients
on the interaction dummy variables SASM*D95 and SASM*D96, which control
for self-advised/self-managed REIT status in 1995 and 1996, indicate that
internally-advised REITs have betas that are approximately 17 percentage points
and 12 percentage points higher than externally-advised REITs, respectively. This
reﬂects the market’s perception of these ﬁrms as internally-advised (unproven)
growth stocks. In other words, operating companies are viewed as riskier than
asset holding companies since management is riskier. We also include variables
controlling for ﬁnancial factors such as ﬁrm size, capital structure and property
type. The results indicate that ﬁrms with higher FFO and asset growth rates have
lower betas. However, ﬁrms with higher payout ratios and greater leverage have






















Exhibit 5  Relationship between REIT Systematic Risk (), WACC, ROC, EVA Spread and REIT Status
Beta () WACC ROC Spread
Parameter Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
Log of Market Cap 7.6E-02 0.6 3.4E-02*** 3.0 3.5E-02** 2.2 6.7E-02*** 3.4
Squared Log of Market Cap 8.7E-03 0.8 2.9E-03*** 2.9 3.3E-03** 2.3 5.9E-03*** 3.4
Asset Growth (%) 1.5E-03*** 2.9 9.2E-05** 2.1 8.9E-05 1.4 2.2E-05 0.3
FFO Growth (%) 7.3E-04 1.6 5.1E-05 0.9 1.5E-04* 1.9 1.2E-06 0.0
Implied Cap Rate (%) 1.7E-02 1.5 1.4E-03 1.4 2.6E-03* 1.7 4.0E-03** 2.2
Payout/FFO (%) 2.3E-03*** 2.6 6.0E-06 0.1 2.5E-05 0.3 2.3E-05 0.2
Total Debt/Total Capitalization 6.5E-04 0.5 2.3E-04** 2.0 6.1E-04*** 3.6 2.7E-04 1.3
Short-term Debt/Long-term Debt 4.6E-01** 2.0 3.7E-02** 2.0 4.6E-02* 1.7 8.2E-02*** 2.5
Hotel 4.4E-01 1.2 2.0E-01*** 5.7 3.3E-02 0.6 1.8E-01*** 2.9
Diversiﬁed 5.7E-01 1.6 1.8E-01*** 5.6 5.6E-02 1.2 1.4E-01** 2.4
Healthcare 5.1E-01 1.4 1.8E-01*** 5.4 5.8E-02 1.2 1.3E-01** 2.2
Industrial 3.1E-01 0.9 1.8E-01*** 5.4 3.2E-02 0.7 1.5E-01*** 2.6
Ofﬁce 6.9E-01* 2.0 1.9E-01*** 6.1 1.4E-02 0.3 1.8E-01*** 3.3
Residential 5.0E-01 1.4 1.7E-01*** 5.4 2.9E-02 0.6 1.5E-01*** 2.7
Retail 5.3E-01 1.5 1.8E-01*** 5.5 3.7E-02 0.8 1.5E-01*** 2.7
Self-Storage 4.2E-01 1.2 1.7E-01*** 5.5 2.6E-02 0.6 1.6E-01*** 2.9
SASM*D90 1.2E-01 0.8 1.9E-02* 1.8 2.4E-03 0.1 2.3E-02 1.1
SASM*D91 1.7E-01 1.1 3.5E-02*** 3.0 1.2E-02 0.7 3.6E-02* 1.9

































































Exhibit 5  (continued)
Relationship between REIT Systematic Risk (), WACC, ROC, EVA Spread and REIT Status
Beta () WACC ROC Spread
Parameter Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat.
SASM*D93 1.9E-01 1.6 3.2E-02*** 3.4 9.7E-04 0.1 2.9E-02* 1.8
SASM*D94 3.3E-02 0.5 1.8E-02*** 2.5 4.0E-03 0.4 9.4E-03 0.7
SASM*D95 1.7E-01*** 3.0 5.8E-03 1.2 3.6E-05 0.0 5.1E-03 0.6
SASM*D96 1.2E-01** 2.2 1.1E-02*** 2.3 1.1E-03 0.2 1.3E-02* 1.6
R2 0.87 0.94 0.86 0.44
F-Stat. 90.9*** 158.0*** 56.9*** 7.2***
H0: SASM*D90  ...  SASM*D96 1.86* 7.89*** 0.23 2.40**
H0: Hotel  ...  Self-Storage 2.50*** 2.09** 3.53*** 2.73***
Notes:
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.154  Ambrose and Linneman
betas followed by retail and healthcare segments. Industrial REITs have the lowest
betas. Finally, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant ﬁrm size impact.
 REIT Capital Costs
As a ﬁnal test of the difference between externally-advised and internally-advised
REITs, we examine the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Utilizing the
betas estimated above, we calculate the WACC for each REIT as:
DPS
WACC  k  k  k , (2)    dpe TC TC TC
where TC  D  P  S and kd, kp and ke are the cost of debt (D), preferred stock
(P) and common stock (S), respectively. The cost of debt and preferred are
estimated as the ratio of total interest cost to book value of debt and preferred
dividends to book value of preferred stock, respectively. The cost of equity is
estimated via CAPM.
As a further measure of REIT cost of capital, we also calculate each REIT’s
Economic Value Added (EVA), where EVA is deﬁned as net operating proﬁt
after taxes minus the capital charge.9 Capital charge is found by multiplying each
REIT’s WACC by its capital employed. In essence, companies create shareholder
wealth when after-tax proﬁt is above the cost of capital (or positive EVA). The
spread between return on capital (ROC) and WACC is an indicator of proﬁtable
investment activity. Positive and increasing spreads indicate a ﬁrm that is
generating proﬁts in excess of its cost of capital.
To test the hypothesis that internally-advised REITs are different from externally-
advised REITs with respect to their cost of capital, we regress the individual REIT
WACC, return on capital (ROC), and EVA spread on ﬁrm size and other ﬁnancial
factors (payout ratio, debt ratio, asset growth, FFO growth, and implied
capitalization rate), controlling for property market segment, and externally-
advised or internally advised status (Exhibit 5). We interact the advisor status
variable with dummy variables for each year to pick up the impact of shifts over
time associated with advisor status. Consistent with Linneman’s (1997) theory on
ﬁrm size, we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size (as measured by the log of ﬁrm equity market
capitalization) is statistically signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the hypothesis that larger
ﬁrms have lower costs of capital. The regression coefﬁcients indicate that a billion
dollar increase in REIT market capitalization translates into approximately a 2.2%
decline in WACC, a 2.3% increase in return on capital and a 4.3% increase in the
EVA spread. Given the non-linear relationship implied by the quadratic effect, we
calculate that the minimum WACC (8.4%) occurs for ﬁrms with market
capitalizations of $340 million. However, we ﬁnd the maximum return on capital
(7.1%) occurs for ﬁrms with market capitalizations of $960 million. It isREIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  155
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interesting to note that REITs with higher implied capitalization rates have lower
EVA spreads and returns on capital. The results also indicate that REITs with
higher asset growth rates have lower WACCs and ﬁrms with higher FFO growth
rates have higher return on capital ratios (ROC). Firms with higher debt ratios
have a signiﬁcantly lower cost of capital (as measured by WACC and ROC), but
have higher risk. However, the return on capital (ROC) and EVA spread decline
as the percentage of short-term debt increases, while WACC and REIT betas
increase. These results conﬁrm the notion that short-term debt is expensive and
reduces proﬁtable investments. The statistically signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for
short-term debt percent indicates that investment prospects are harder to exploit
due to limited borrowing capacity as short-term borrowing increases.
The hotel sector has the highest cost of capital followed by ofﬁce REITs. Both
diversiﬁed and healthcare REITs have similar costs of capital at 2.2 percentage
points below the hotel property sector. However, it is interesting to note the
relatively small variation in WACCs across property sector segments. Diversiﬁed
and healthcare REITs have the highest return on capital ratios while ofﬁce and
self-storage REITs have the lowest return ratios.
Finally, we can reject the hypothesis that the estimated coefﬁcients in the WACC
model for internally-advised REITs are equal. The interaction variables indicate
that REIT WACCs were larger for internally-advised REIT in the early 1990s.
However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that internally- and externally-advised
ROC ratios are different over time. Finally, the estimated coefﬁcients indicate that
internally-advised REITs EVA spreads are different over time with internally-
advised REITs having higher spreads in 1995 and 1996. Again, this is consistent
with the results found by Capozza and Seguin (2000) and indicates that internally-
advised REITs continue to outperform externally-advised REITs.
 Conclusion
During the early 1990s, a fundamental shift occurred in the real estate industry,
which lead to the creation of many internally-advised REITs. This article
documents the differences between externally-advised and internally-advised
REITs and notes that the internally-advised REITs are rapidly dominating the real
estate industry. Between 1991 and 1996, externally-advised REIT equity market
capitalizations increased from $6 billion to $20 billion, while internally-advised
REIT equity market capitalizations increased from $4 billion to over $102 billion.
Our analysis conﬁrms that externally-advised REITs are quickly transforming
themselves to remain competitive with the internally-advised REITs.
In addition, we test the hypothesis that the structural form of internally-advised
REITs is inherently superior to externally-advised REITs and thus will manifest
in signiﬁcant differences in operating performance. Evidence supporting this
hypothesis is mixed. Using a dataset of 139 equity REITs, we examined
differences between externally-advised and internally-advised REITs with respect156  Ambrose and Linneman
to operating structure, growth prospects, operating revenue and expenses, cash
ﬂow and proﬁtability, equity returns, betas and capital costs. Regression results
indicate that internally-advised REITs do have higher ratios of rental revenue to
total revenue, lower payout ratios and lower costs of capital after 1993. However,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in return on capital (ROC), return on book equity
(ROE) or proﬁt margins between internally and externally-advised REITs. Thus,
it appears that after controlling for ﬁrm size and property sector effects, any
advantage enjoyed by internally-advised REITs is minor.
We also test Linneman’s (1997) hypothesis that scale economies exist due to ﬁrm
size. Regression results indicate that larger ﬁrms do have higher proﬁt margins
and rental revenue ratios and lower implied capitalization rates. However, we do
not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm size and expense ratios.
Finally, examining the impact of ﬁrm size on REIT weighted average cost of
capital, return on capital and EVA spread conﬁrms the hypothesis that large REITs
do enjoy an advantage in signiﬁcantly lower costs of capital. Our results indicate
that every billion dollar increase in market capitalization translates into a 2.2%
reduction in capital costs.
 Appendix
  Externally- and Internally-advised REITs
Exhibit A-1  Externally-advised REITs—Not Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date
1 Alexander’s, Inc. ALX 014752109 Oct86
2 American General Hospitality Inc. AGT 025930108 Jul96
3 American Health Properties, Inc. AHE 026494104 Feb87
4 American Real Estate Investment Corporation REA 029166105 Nov93
5 Boykin Lodging Company BOY 103430104 Oct96
6 EQK Realty Investors I EKR 268820107 Mar85
7 EastGroup Properties, Inc. EGP 277270104 Dec71
8 Equity Inns, Inc. ENN 294703103 Feb94
9 Franklin Select Realty Trust FSN 354638108 Mar89
10 HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. HMG 404232100 Sep72
11 Health & Retirement Properties Trust HRP 422169102 Dec86
12 Hospitality Properties Trust HPT 44106M102 Aug95
13 Host Funding, Inc. HFD 441072105 Apr96
14 Income Opportunity Realty Investors, Inc. IOT 452926108 Oct86
15 Innkeepers USA Trust KPA 4576J0104 Sep94REIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  157
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Exhibit A-1  (continued)
Externally-advised REITs—Not Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date
16 Irvine Apartment Communities, Inc. IAC 463606103 Dec93
17 MGI Properties MGI 552885105 Mar72
18 Meridian Point Realty Trust VIII Co. MPH 589954106 Oct88
19 Public Storage Properties XI, Inc. PSM 744609108 Mar91
20 Public Storage Properties XX, Inc. PSZ 744620105 Sep91
21 RFS Hotel Investors, Inc. RFS 74955J108 Aug93
22 Realty ReFund Trust RRF 756125100 Jul72
23 Sizeler Property Investors, Inc. SIZ 830137105 Feb87
24 Sunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. SSI 867933103 Aug95
25 Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc. TCI 893617209 Feb85
26 USP Real Estate Investment Trust USPTS 903370104 Aug88
27 Universal Health Realty Income Trust UHT 91359E109 Jan87
28 Value Property Trust VLP 919904102 May71
29 Washington Real Estate Investment Trust WRE 939653101 Jun61
Exhibit A-2  Internally-advised REITs—Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date SASM Date
30 ASR Investments Corporation ASR 001932201 Aug87 Nov96
31 Agree Realty Corporation ADC 008492100 Apr94 Apr94
32 Alexander Haagen Properties, Inc. ACH 40443E104 Dec93 Dec93
33 Ambassador Apartments, Inc. AAH 02316A102 Aug94 Aug94
34 Amli Residential Properties Trust AML 001735109 Feb94 Feb94
35 Apartment Investment and Management Company AIV 03748R101 Jul94 Jul94
36 Arden Realty Inc. ARI 039793104 Oct96 Oct96
37 Associated Estates Realty Corporation AEC 045604105 Nov93 Nov93
38 Avalon Properties, Inc. AVN 053469102 Nov93 Nov93
39 BRE Properties, Inc. BRE 05564E109 Jul70 Oct95
40 Bay Apartment Communities, Inc. BYA 072012107 Mar94 Mar94
41 Bedford Property Investors, Inc. BED 076446301 Jan85 Jul92
42 Berkshire Realty Company, Inc. BRI 084710102 Jun91 Feb97
43 BoddieNoell Properties, Inc. BNP 096903109 May87 Oct94
44 Burnham Paciﬁc Properties, Inc. BPP 12232C108 Mar87 Dec95
45 CBL & Associates Properties, Inc. CBL 124830100 Oct93 Oct93158  Ambrose and Linneman
Exhibit A-2  (continued)
Internally-advised REITs—Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date SASM Date
46 Camden Property Trust CPT 133131102 Jul93 Jul93
47 Capstone Capital Corporation CCT 14066R102 Jun94 Jun94
48 CenterPoint Properties Trust CNT 151895109 Dec93 Dec93
49 Charles E. Smith Residential Realty, Inc. SRW 832197107 Jun94 Jun94
50 Chelsea GCA Realty, Inc. CCG 163262108 Oct93 Oct93
51 Colonial Properties Trust CLP 195872106 Sep93 Sep93
52 Commercial Net Lease Realty, Inc. NNN 202218103 Oct84 May97
53 Cousins Properties Incorporated CUZ 222795106 Jan97 Apr87
54 Crescent Real Estate Equities Company CEI 225756105 Apr94 Apr94
55 Crown American Realty Trust CWN 228186102 Aug93 Aug93
56 Developers Diversiﬁed Realty Corporation DDR 251591103 Feb93 Feb93
57 Duke Realty Investments, Inc. DRE 264411505 Jan86 Oct93
58 Equity Residential Properties Trust EQR 29476L107 Aug93 Aug93
59 Essex Property Trust, Inc. ESS 297178105 Jun94 Jun94
60 Evans Withycombe Residential, Inc. EWR 299212100 Aug94 Aug94
61 Excel Realty Trust, Inc. XEL 30067R107 Aug93 Aug93
62 FAC Realty Trust, Inc. FAC 301953105 Jun93 Jun93
63 Federal Realty Investment Trust FRT 313747206 Jun75 Jun89
64 FelCor Suite Hotels, Inc. FCH 314305103 Jul94 Jul94
65 First Industrial Realty Trust, Inc. FR 32054K103 Jun94 Jun94
66 First Union Real Estate Equity and
Mortgage In
FUR 337400105 May70 Jan94
67 First Washington Realty Trust, Inc. FRW 337489504 Jun94 Jun94
68 Franchise Finance Corporation of America FFA 351807102 Jun94 Jun94
69 Gables Residential Trust GBP 362418105 Jan94 Jan94
70 General Growth Properties, Inc. GGP 370021107 Apr93 Apr93
71 Glenborough Realty Trust Incorporated GLB 37803P105 Dec95 Dec95
72 Glimcher Realty Trust GRT 379302102 Jan94 Jan94
73 Grove Property Trust GVE 399613108 Jun94 Jun94
74 HRE Properties, Inc. HRE 404265100 Jul69 Jan86
75 Health Care Property Investors, Inc. HCP 421915109 May85 May88
76 Healthcare Realty Trust, Inc. HR 421946104 Jun93 Jun93
77 Highwoods Properties, Inc. HIW 431284108 Jun94 Jun94
78 Home Properties of New York, Inc. HME 437306103 Jul94 Jul94
79 Horizon Group, Inc. HGI 44041X106 Nov93 Nov93REIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  159
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Exhibit A-2  (continued)
Internally-advised REITs—Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date SASM Date
80 IRT Property Company IRT 450058102 Apr71 Jan90
81 JDN Realty Corporation JDN 465917102 Mar94 Mar94
82 JP Realty, Inc. JPR 46624A106 Jan94 Jan94
83 Kilroy Realty Corporation KRC 49427F108 Jan97 Jan97
84 Koger Equity, Inc. KE 500228101 Aug88 Dec93
85 Kranzco Realty Trust KRT 50076E107 Nov92 Nov92
86 Lexington Corporate Properties Trust LXP 529039109 Oct93 Aug95
87 Liberty Property Trust LRY 531172104 Jun94 Jun94
88 Macerich Company MAC 554382101 Mar94 Mar94
89 Malan Realty Investors, Inc. MAL 561063108 Jun94 Jun94
90 Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. MHC 564682102 Mar93 Mar93
91 Mark Centers Trust MCT 570382101 Jun93 Jun93
92 Meridian Industrial Trust, Inc. MDN 589643105 Feb96 Jun5
93 Merry Land & Investment Company, Inc. MRY 590438107 Apr92 Apr92
94 Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc. MAA 59522J103 Jan94 Jan94
95 Mid-America Realty Investments, Inc. MDI 59522K100 Dec86 Dec86
96 Mid-Atlantic Realty Trust MRR 595232109 Sep93 Sep93
97 Mills Corporation MLS 601148109 Apr94 Apr94
98 National Golf Properties, Inc. TEE 63623G109 Aug93 Aug93
99 Nationwide Health Properties, Inc. NHP 638620104 Dec85 Jun88
100 New Plan Realty Trust NPR 648059103 Jul62 Aug88
101 Oasis Residential, Inc. OAS 674216106 Oct93 Oct93
102 One Liberty Properties, Inc. OLP 682406103 Dec82 Jan95
103 Paciﬁc Gulf Properties, Inc. PAG 694396102 Feb94 Feb94
104 Parkway Properties, Inc. PKY 70159Q104 Aug96 Aug96
105 Patriot American Hospitality, Inc. PAH 703353102 Sep95 Sep95
106 Pennsylvania Real Estate Investment Trust PEI 709102107 Jun70 Sep97
107 Post Properties, Inc. PPS 737464107 Jul93 Jul93
108 Prentiss Properties Trust Inc. PP 740706106 Oct96 Oct96
109 Price REIT, Inc. RET 74147T105 Dec91 Dec91
110 Public Storage, Inc. PSA 74460D109 Jul80 Nov95
111 Ramco-Gershenson Properties Trust RPT 751452103 Dec88 May96
112 Realty Income Corporation O 756109104 Oct94 Aug95
113 Reckson Associates Realty Corporation RA 75621K106 May95 May95
114 Regency Realty Corporation REG 758939102 Oct93 Oct93160  Ambrose and Linneman
Exhibit A-2  (continued)
Internally-advised REITs—Self-advised/Self-managed
REIT Ticker Cusip IPO Date SASM Date
115 Rouse Company RSE 779273101 Nov95 Nov95
116 Saul Centers, Inc. BFS 804395101 Aug93 Aug93
117 Security Capital Atlantic Incorporated SCA 814137105 Oct96 Sep97
118 Security Capital Industrial Trust SCN 814138103 Mar94 Sep97
119 Security Capital Paciﬁc Trust PTR 814141107 Jun89 Sep97
120 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. SHU 82567D104 Mar94 Mar95
121 Sovran Self Storage, Inc. SSS 84610H108 Jun95 Jun95
122 Spieker Properties, Inc. SPK 848497103 Nov93 Nov93
123 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Trust HOT 855905204 May72 Jan95
124 Storage Trust Realty SEA 861909109 Nov94 Nov94
125 Storage USA, Inc. SUS 861907103 Mar94 Mar94
126 Summit Properties, Inc. SMT 866239106 Feb94 Feb94
127 Sun Communities, Inc. SUI 866674104 Dec93 Dec93
128 Tanger Factory Outlet Centers, Inc. SKT 875465106 May93 May93
129 Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO 876664103 Nov92 Nov92
130 Town and Country Trust TCT 892081100 Aug93 Aug93
131 TriNet Corporate Realty Trust, Inc. TRI 896287109 May93 May93
132 United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. UDR 910197102 May90 Dec89
133 United Mobile Homes, Inc. UMH 911024107 Dec92 Dec92
134 Urban Shopping Centers, Inc. URB 917060105 Oct93 Oct93
135 Vornado Realty Trust VNO 929042109 May93 May93
136 Walden Residential Properties, Inc. WDN 931210108 Feb94 Feb94
137 Weeks Corporation WKS 94856P102 Aug94 Aug94
138 Weingarten Realty Investors WRI 948741103 Mar88 Jan93
139 Western Investment Real Estate Trust WIR 958468100 Jun84 May87
Note: SASM Date is the date the REIT became self-advised/self-managed.
 Endnotes
1 The conﬂict of interest between REITs and outside advisors and management and the
resulting impact on value is widely recognized. For example, Howe and Shilling (1990)
examine the effect of advisor selection of ﬁnancial performance while Hsieh and Sirmans
(1991) and Wei, Hsieh and Sirmans (1995) examine the performance of REITs with close
business relationships with their advisors. Sagalyn (1996) gives a general overview of
the various conﬂicts of interest in the REIT structure.REIT Structure and Operating Characteristics  161
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2 New Plan Realty Trust (NPR) claims to be the ﬁrst REIT to convert in August 1988.
However, several other REITs either had gone public as self-advised/self-managed as
early as 1986 or were also working on converting at the same time.
3 This hypothesis is formally presented in Linneman (1997).
4 Data on percentage of ownership across property segments was obtained from the 1996
REIT Handbook.
5 REIT concentration is deﬁned as the percentage of assets held in a single property type.
Thus, REITs with greater than 75% concentration have more than 75% of their assets
invested in one property type while REITs with less than 75% concentration are invested
in several property types.
6 Total market capitalization is deﬁned as end of year total debt plus the market value of
common stock (and partnership units) plus the value of preferred shares.
7 Return on equity (ROE) is deﬁned as net income as a percentage of average total equity
(adjusted for operating units).
8 The monthly risk-free rate is proxied using CRSP Government Bond Index for bonds
less than twelve months to maturity.
9 See Stewart (1991) or Walbert (1994).
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